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HAROLD TARRANT 
ι THE PLATONICS 
This chapter deals with the development of Platonism from the late first cen­
tury BCE to the end of the second century CE. The principal figures here, in 
rough chronological order, were Eudorus, Thrasyllus, anon. Commentary on the 
Theaetetus, Plutarch of Chaeronea, Theon, Taurus, Albinus, Nicostratus, Atti-
cus, Severus, Harpocration, and Alcinous. All are normally treated as Platonists 
today; antiquity treated most of them as 'Platonics'. 
By the end of the first century CE we hear of philosophers who could be 
described as 'Platonics' (Platonici), whether as a title connected with a recognized 
profession or as a general description of their concerns.1 There were a number 
of centres around the Mediterranean at which a 'Platonic' might reside and 
operate. During the Hellenistic period there had been no need for such a term 
at all, since one's philosophical background had usually been indicated with 
reference to the philosophical group or school with which one had studied 
(usually at Athens), and to which one continued to feel some allegiance. U p to 
Cicero's generation it was normal for those with serious educational ambitions 
to study in Athens, and not unusual to seek tuition from more than one school. 
Those men of letters who felt the need to communicate in a philosophical 
vein did not normally have to adopt any title that indicated their favourite 
philosophy, while those who claimed to officially represent a school, and to 
teach its doctrines or methods, adopted such titles to legitimize their role. Such 
a title was usually based on the name that the original school had taken, usually 
from the location of its activities. Hence those feeling a close connection with 
Plato's school would have been known simply as 'Academics'. 
1
 See Glucker 197S: 206—25 for a discussion of the relevant terminology. Cicero's brother once calls 
him a homo platonicus, but there is no evidence as yet that any philosopher chooses to specify his 
interest using this term. Glucker speaks of Thrasyllus as the first known philosopher to be called by 
this term. 
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The term 'Academic' had described individuals of very different types. The 
fragments of the early Scholarchs (Heads of the Academy) show that they 
differed considerably in their range of interests and in the doctrine that they 
promoted. There was considerable scope for disagreement with Plato himself, 
as shown by the metaphysical system of Speusippus, his nephew, who was first 
to succeed him. To Xenocrates, the third Scholarch, though he was less often 
in open disagreement with Plato, are credited many doctrines that one would 
not have expected Plato to endorse. Both of these had been part of the vibrant 
debates of Plato's later years, and were consequently more obviously influenced 
by the Plato that we know from the 'late' dialogues. Fourth came Polemo, who 
had joined the Academy under Xenocrates and clearly specialized in ethics. 
In this area our sources see him as having been in broad agreement with his 
predecessors, particularly Xenocrates. Together with his long-term friend and 
colleague Crates, who briefly succeeded him, he appears to have developed the 
notion of divine love as an educational catalyst, building on Plato's much earlier 
Symposium, and to have cultivated the more Socratic image of a man inspired 
by something divine. These features may have given a more Socratic image to 
the Academy overall than it had had under earlier Scholarchs. 
Up until this point later sources saw the Academy as retaining the same general 
character of positive teaching as they associated with Plato, but Numenius (fr. 
24.5—18) thought that the Platonic doctrines were being eroded, even though 
he seems to have respected Xenocrates in particular. In his eyes, as in the eyes 
of Cicero and his mentor Antiochus of Ascalon, the major break had come 
with the accession of Arcesilaus, who seems to have modelled himself on a 
rather different 'Socrates', the one who in Plato's early dialogues frequently 
professes his ignorance and habitually refrains from offering his own opinion on 
the matter being debated. The Academy had engaged dialectically with other 
schools, but for the demolition of rival systems rather than for the construction 
of any positive body of doctrine of its own, and it adopted the technique, not 
unknown in Plato's so-called 'early' doctrines, of arguing both for and against 
a thesis. This 'sceptical' Academy as we call it continued for some generations, 
and its greatest exponent was Carneades in the middle of the second century 
BCE. Interpretations of Carneades himself varied, but a loyalty to some version 
of Carneades had continued alongside the school's nominal loyalty to Plato for 
some time. As long as the Academy maintained some sense of an unbroken 
tradition one needed no separate category of philosophers to be known as 
Platonists. 
Some twelve years into the final century BCE the Mithridatic Wars caused 
major upheaval in Athens, the schools ceased to function in their traditional 
way, and Athens lost much of its pre-eminence in the higher educational world. 
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Followers of the Platonic Academy, already seemingly experiencing uneasy rela-
tions, broke into open dissension, and conflict occurred over the true heritage 
of the Academy between the surviving Scholarch, Philo of Larissa (158—84 BCE), 
and his rapidly rising pupil, Antiochus of Ascalon. The latter wanted to draw a 
distinction between the Old Academy, as it had been under Scholarchs down 
to Crates, and a New Academy ushered in by Arcesilaus at the beginning of the 
second quarter of the third century BCE, but the distinction itself proved con-
troversial and the term 'Academic' eventually became confined to those who 
welcomed the contribution of Arcesilaus and his so-called 'scepticism', not nec-
essarily to the exclusion of doctrines associated with Plato and his immediate 
successors. Ultimately, this also meant that a different term would have to be 
found for those who preferred to signal their allegiance to Plato without any 
suggestion that they found Arcesilaus' contribution helpful. Inscriptional evi-
dence and a variety of texts make it clear that the term 'Platonic' eventually 
supplied what was needed, but from the beginning the term was potentially 
confusing. 
An anonymous Commentary on the Theaetetus, which cannot be later than 
the papyrus which preserves it (c. 150 CE) and is often held to date from the 
first century CE or slightly earlier, refers to 'those from the Academy' as those 
who accepted the 'sceptical' heritage of the school, associating them with a 
particular type of philosophic activity or stance (70.12-26, cf. 6.30-41), while some 
in his day used the term 'Academic' more obviously to indicate a sceptical 
position (54.38-43). It is thus becoming a word to describe a particular type of 
philosophical stance, in the same way as 'Epicurean', 'Stoic', or 'Pyrrhonian' 
(6.21, 6.29—7.1, 11.23, 61.11, 63.3, 70.18). The term 'Platonic', however, is 
used at 2.11—12 and fr. D to indicate people occupied with the interpretation 
of Plato. It remained possible as late as Proclus to refer by the term 'Platonic' 
to interpreters whose primary allegiance is to another philosopher's system.2 
This meant that no term unambiguously referred to those professing adher-
ence to Plato's doctrines, although the majority of Plato's interpreters clearly 
did so. 
In these circumstances a working definition of a Platonist in this period 
might include any who appear to promote an essentially Platonic doctrinal 
system, which will, as a minimum, involve a role for transcendent ideas and 
for some kind of life beyond the body for the core of the human person; 
and any with a special liking for dealing with Platonic texts, regardless of any 
2
 Panaetius the Stoic (In Tim. 1.162.12—13) and Numenius, more correctly called a Pythagorean (In 
Remp. 2.96.11, cf. Iambi. De an. 23). The case of Trypho, who is called a Stoic and Platonic by 
Porphyry (VPlot. 17), is unclear, but he may have been a Stoic with strong interests in interpreting 
Plato. 
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allegiance to another philosophy. A full treatment of Platonism during this 
period would find some place for all Platonic interpreters (except those who 
are polemically motivated), for, as is often observed, doctrine and interpretation 
of key Platonic texts seem to go hand in hand. In fact some of the most 
noteworthy developments in Platonic interpretation seem to stem from the 
'Neopythagorean' Numenius, even though by no means all of his doctrines 
made a lasting impression on the development of Platonism. 
2 VARIETIES OF PLATONISM 
The Platonism of the two to three centuries before Plotinus is traditionally 
known as 'Middle Platonism'. This term is inclined to give the impression 
that there is a distinct brand of Platonism that intervenes between (i) the true 
Platonism of Plato and his immediate successors and (2) a distinct modification 
ofthat Platonism that characterizes Plotinus and all ancient Platonists thereafter. 
In this regard the term 'Middle Platonism' is misleading, and I hope largely 
to avoid it here. Some Platonists with whom we shall deal were more faithful 
to the original spirit of Plato's doctrines than Plato's immediate successors, and 
others had ideas that took sufficient liberties with interpretation and doctrine 
to embarrass Plotinus and his circle. 
Because Plotinus never wrote commentaries, much of the philosophical work 
of Porphyry, Iamblichus, Proclus, Damascius and Olympiodorus appears to 
have as great a debt to pre-Plotinian interpreters as to the philosophical vision 
of Plotinus. Porphyry speaks of the hupomnëmata (reminders or annotations, 
usually indicating some kind of 'commentary') that were read in Plotinus' 
circle, and they included the work of prominent second-century Platonists, of 
at least one Pythagorean (Numenius), and of prominent recent Peripatetics. 
That they were all read does not indicate that they were treated with equal 
respect, but rather that all could offer a platform that became the basis for 
fruitful doctrinal and exegetical discussion. It is noteworthy that there is no 
mention of the commentaries of any whom Plotinus had known personally, 
whether teachers such as Ammonius Saccas, rivals such as Longinus, or friends 
such as Origines and Amelius. It is not surprising, then, that through Porphyry 
the so-called 'Middle Platonists' seem to have had as much influence on the 
way that Plato commentaries developed as Plotinus did. And of the friends of 
Plotinus whom Porphyry used, Origenes and Amelius were in turn influenced 
by pre-Plotinian Platonists. 
Those who had cast doubt on the originality of Plotinus during his lifetime 
saw him as belonging to the tradition of those with a combined allegiance 
to Plato and to Pythagoras, including both Moderatus (late first century CE) 
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and Numenius who were nominally Pythagoreans.3 This ought to alert us to 
the fact that contemporaries did not see a great resemblance between Plotinus 
and seemingly more conventional Platonists, such as the biographer Plutarch 
(c. 45—125 CE), Gaius (floruit c. 125 CE), Albinus (floruit c. 150 CE), and Atticus 
(floruit c. 178 CE). Hence Plotinus himself could be seen as something of a 
'fringe Platonist', but that cannot be said for his influential follower Porphyry, 
who came to Plotinus already steeped in the more regular scholarly Platonism 
taught by Longinus and retained a mind of his own on some important issues. 
One way of distinguishing types of Platonism among Plotinus' predeces-
sors has been to classify them according to their friendliness or hostility to 
certain other philosophers and philosophical schools, particularly Academic 
'sceptics', Aristotle, Pythagoras and the Stoa. Karamanolis has recently exam-
ined the whole period with regard to its shifting attitude towards Aristotle, 
most often an uneasy ally, but an undoubted enemy for Atticus and perhaps 
also for some others.4 Scholars of the early twentieth century were sufficiently 
struck by widespread use of Stoic terminology to postulate strong influence 
on that front, but this is seldom accompanied by radical concessions to Stoic 
doctrine, merely by the willingness to be swayed by good Stoic arguments on 
occasions where the natural boundaries of Platonism permitted it. And in logic 
the Platonists, if they were going to offer strong guidance to their pupils, had 
little choice but to supplement anything they could find in Plato with approved 
doctrine from either Aristotle or the Stoa. Even so, some found more to criticize 
here than others. So many different attitudes to Aristotle and (to a lesser degree) 
the Stoa are detectable that it is ultimately impossible to categorize these 
Platonists according to such criteria. What we can say with some certainty 
is that Plotinus had such a wide range of precedents that the degree to which 
he chose to be swayed by Aristotle or the Stoa was his own decision. 
Platonists might also be distinguished on the basis of their dominant inter-
ests, some seemingly being preoccupied with mathematics, such as Theon of 
Smyrna (contemporary with Plutarch), others with ethics (though grounded 
in theology), and others with philosophical literature, such as Apuleius (floruit 
c. 160 CE). Such a distinction is problematic because of our limited knowledge 
of the output of most of them. Again, they could be distinguished on the basis 
of geography, dividing those operating in Athens from those functioning else-
where, as Dillon (1977) did, but with the subsequent collapse of the 'School 
3
 Unknown persons, answered by Amelius. Longinus and the author himself in Porph. VPiot. 17—21. 
4
 Karamanolis 2006. Lucius, Nicostratus and Eudorus come to mind, insofar as they are hostile to 
Aristotle's work the Categories, but it is unsafe to infer a general hostility from this more specific 
one. 
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of Gaius' theory that had once seemed to give a little coherence to the non-
Athenian practitioners, such a distinction fails to capture any essential difference. 
Finally one might make distinctions on the basis of the degree of literalism with 
which interpreters approached Platonic texts, with Atticus as Proclus' supreme 
example of the literalist, followed perhaps by Plutarch, Gaius and Albinus; at 
the other extreme one finds Numenius and those influenced by him. In the 
end, however, it would seem that early imperial Platonism had many faces that 
are not easily categorized. It was finding its way forward, first discovering how 
to read Plato, then discovering explanations for the anomalies, and ultimately 
finding explanations for passages that pointed towards unpalatable doctrines. 
Ultimately, this led to reading Platonic texts imaginatively, but as John Dillon has 
shown with regard to Platonist commentaries of the era a great deal of'pedantry 
and pedestrianism' remained alongside more illuminating exegesis.5 
3 THE WRITTEN COMMUNICATION OF PLATONISM 
The writings of these Platonists fell into a variety of categories, one of which 
was the Platonic 'commentary'. It is a constraint for us that no complete or 
near-complete commentary survives. The Theaetetus commentary does not get 
far beyond the introductory stages of the dialogue before the papyrus runs 
out at around 158b, but it does give us a reasonably clear idea of the type 
of lemmata, the way that they are explained by paraphrase, and the extent 
of the more adventurous hermeneutic material. Two papyrus fragments of an 
Alcibiades commentary do not give a radically different impression, nor do 
other papyrus fragments to be dated from this period. The chief dialogue to 
attract commentaries was the Timaeus, this seemingly being the work that 
every Platonist curriculum had to include. The impressive fragments of Taurus' 
Commentary on the Timaeus (T22—34 Gioè), perhaps written at around his alleged 
floruit of 145 CE, are sufficient to make us wish for more, but, unfortunately, we 
do not possess from this period a substantial piece of continuous commentary 
on this pivotal dialogue, other than the work of Galen on its medical parts. 
Galen had Platonist leanings, but he lived and thought primarily as a physician, 
not as a professional philosopher. His admiration for Plato did not cause him to 
commit to key doctrines concerning the transcendent Ideas and an immortal 
inner person. And he informs us that he is atypical in wanting to comment 
upon these later physiological parts of the Timaeus at all. At the beginning of 
the work Platonists in the second century tended not to comment on anything 
3
 Dillon 2006. 
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preceding Timaeus' great monologue,6 and all that we know to have attracted 
regular Platonist comment before Porphyry could be loosely described as the 
part pertaining to physical and metaphysical principles. 
Some idea of the sections of the Timaeus that attracted attention can be 
gleaned from Calcidius' rather later Latin translation and commentary. This 
is generally agreed to reflect broadly the perspective of pre-Plotinian Platon-
ism, and it makes substantial acknowledged and unacknowledged use of the 
Platonist Theon of Smyrna, the Platonizing Peripatetic Adrastus, and the Pla-
tonizing Pythagorean Numenius. These debts, however, should not be allowed 
to obscure the fact that Calcidius has an agenda, which is itself a later one than 
the period with which we are dealing. Not all even of this commentary has 
survived, but we also have its table of contents that gives a general idea of the 
commentary's scope. Calcidius' translation of the Latin begins at the begin-
ning, but his commentary proper begins with 31c and later material returns to 
28b. The early conversation and the story of Atlantis he dismisses as involv-
ing straightforward narrative.7 Translation and commentary run out at 53c. A 
commentary so clearly divided into topics rather than into sections of text does 
have its later (and fuller) counterpart in Proclus' Commentary on the Republic, 
but to what extent it was normal in the first two centuries CE we cannot guess. 
It is quite possible that a number of different formats were used according to 
the teaching styles of different individuals and the suitability of each style to 
particular Platonic works. 
Some interpretative works actually centred on single questions raised by 
Platonic texts or on quite short passages in dialogues. We have several examples 
of the former in Plutarch's Platonic Questions, while his On the Generation of the 
Soul in the Timaeus is of the latter kind, but it seems that a number of authors 
did tackle key passages like the 'Myth of Er' in the Republic.*1 
Interpretative works served to expose the pupil to the heritage of Platonism, 
once they had opted for it. Other works were required to introduce Platonic 
doctrines to those who might be considering such an option and to those 
who wished to familiarize themselves with a variety of philosophical systems 
as Cicero and many others had done. The doctrinal handbook, such as that of 
6
 Severus is the one singled out for mention by Proclus (In Tim. 1.204.17—18 = T3 Gioè) for declining 
to comment on any of the introductory material; compare our remarks on Calcidius below. 
7
 58.26-59.2 Waszink; like his avoidance of allegorical interpretation, this treatment of the story of 
Solon, prehistoric Athens, and Atlantis as a simplex narratio. . . rerum ante gestamm et historiae veteris 
recensitio seems to guarantee that he is not here under the influence of Numenius (Proc. In Tim. 
1.76.30—77.23 = fr. 37 des Places) or Cronius. Rather it suggests Severus (Proc. In Tim. 1.204. ιό—18; 
cf. Longinus, ibid. 18—24). 
8
 Dercyllides in Theon. Exposition 198.9; cf. Plutarch's discussion of the four regular solids in the 
Timaeus in Obsolescence of Oracles. 
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Alcinous or Apuleius' De Platone, should be distinguished from introductions 
to Platonic texts such as Albinus' Prologue and the source (in the Thrasyllan 
tradition) of Diogenes Laertius 3.48—67. There remained rivalries between the 
different philosophies, so that polemical treatises continued to be written against, 
for instance, Stoics and Epicureans. With Atticus, it becomes clear that anti-
Aristotelian polemic could become polemic against those of one's own primary 
persuasion who adopted facets of Aristotelian doctrine. Indeed, it is inevitable 
that Platonism's dominance during this period would result in what we might 
call 'internal' quarrels about Platonism's true nature. 
Platonists were acutely aware that Plato had mostly written in dialogue form, 
and that he was both a philosopher and a literary author. As a result those 
Platonists with obvious literary talents sometimes tried to use them to enhance 
their message. Plutarch wrote many dialogues in the Platonic tradition that 
attempt to communicate ideas of a predominantly Platonist kind. Numenius also 
wrote in dialogue form in his On the Good. Apuleius experimented with a variety 
of literary forms, often leaving us with strong suggestions of a philosophical 
message without reducing the works' appeal for those who might normally 
reject philosophy. Examples are to be found in his Metamorphoses (or Golden 
Ass) and his series of short pieces known as the Florida. 
4 THE QUESTION OF PRE-PLOTINIAN PLATONISM'S SOURCES 
The questions of the origins of what was then called 'Middle Platonism' used to 
be keenly debated. When viewed, rather artificially, as a single movement, the 
Platonism of this period seemed to demand a father-figure whose vision gave 
it its shape, as (it was presumed) Plato had done earlier and Plotinus would do 
later. The Platonists with whom we are dealing had not usually left enough for 
us to expect to see them acknowledging such a figure, Plotinus had not been in 
the habit of referring to intellectuals of the Roman era, and Porphyry's list of 
commentators read in Plotinus' circle (VPlot 14) includes only Severus, Gaius 
and Atticus of those styled 'Platonists'. Of those who are mentioned regularly 
by Proclus in his Commentary on the Timaeus (again probably reflecting what 
had once appeared in Porphyry) the earliest is Plutarch, who spans the first and 
second centuries CE. 
Plutarch himself, although an 'intellectual giant' of the Platonic tradition, is 
too late to have interested scholars as the supposed luminary who introduced the 
new Platonism, and there were other arguments for by-passing him too. First, 
though not inclined to conceal firmly held views, he is not an open advocate of 
the Platonist 'dogmatism' that scholars had perceived as a precondition for this 
kind of Platonism, and he seems to see himself in the tradition of the 'New' 
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as well as the 'Old' Academy, questioning the validity of the distinction that 
Antiochus of Ascalon had forcefully made. Antiochus had been the staunchest 
advocate of Platonic 'dogmatism', but when Plutarch mentions him in his 
Life of Cicero (4) he appears to disapprove of his innovations and to suspect his 
motivation. Second, Plutarch, though a lively intellectual of Platonist persuasion 
who conversed regularly with others, was not the Head of some famous Platonist 
school and is not the 'professional philosopher' that scholars were seeking. 
Third, we have enough of Plutarch to know that he did not leave behind the 
clearly articulated Platonic system that was thought to have been influential, 
for he often communicates obliquely, making considerable use of multi-speaker 
dialogues when writing in the Platonic tradition, sometimes employing myth 
and metaphor to hint at his deepest views, and at others applying Platonism to 
more peripheral questions of some contemporary interest. Hence, the onus is 
usually on his own interpreters to read a Platonic system into his work. Finally, 
Plutarch refers to others who can be regarded as his own predecessors. 
Much of this only demonstrates the unrealistic expectations about a second 
founder of Platonism: the expected professional philosopher who re-establishes 
Platonism by promoting a new vision with dogmatic force and systematic clarity 
never existed. It is, however, to Plutarch that we must first go if we desire to trace 
further back the origins of early imperial Platonism. To begin with, Plutarch 
can be plausibly connected with several of those who followed him. His name is 
regularly connected with Atticus in Proclus (In Tim. 1.326.1, 381.26—7, 2.153.29, 
3.212.8). The hero of Apuleius' Metamorphoses (or Golden Ass), narrated in the 
first person and so suggestive of autobiographical elements, is said to be related 
to Plutarch and to his nephew Sextus, also a Platonist, something that appears to 
place this odd work (or perhaps its Greek model by Lucius of Patrae) somehow 
in the Platonist allegorical tradition and to acknowledge a debt to Plutarch. 
Such a debt is easy to envisage in the light of the Isis book with which the work 
concludes, and Apuleius also seems close to Plutarch on matters of demonology 
in his De deo Socratis. Finally Aulus Gellius (NA 1.26.4) n a s n i S Platonist mentor 
Taurus refer in glowing terms to Our Plutarch', apparently acknowledging a 
debt. These hints are at least as much as one might expect to have found in 
our fragmentary evidence, and establish that Plutarch was an influential figure 
in this period of Platonism. 
It is therefore with Plutarch that one should begin any search for the origins 
of Platonism. Here it is vital that the depiction of the intellectual life in which 
Platonist views are aired is not such as to conjure up images of large formal 
schools, but of informal intellectual gatherings where views other than those 
of Platonists could find expression. This was a world in which intellectuals 
would travel a good deal, sharing views with those that they encountered 
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elsewhere. Though individuals tended to assume that others had read widely, 
oral activity was clearly of great importance, possibly reflecting the belief that 
Plato himself privileged oral over written activity.9 Revered intellectual beliefs of 
non-Greeks were often introduced, from Egypt for instance, or Persia. Plutarch's 
own revered mentor Ammonius, who bears an Egyptian name and appears in a 
number of dialogues, already speaks with confidence in the broad correctness of 
the Platonic tradition, and the views expressed by him seem to have Plutarch's 
approval. Other characters can also introduce material in the Platonist tradition, 
sometimes involving interpretation of Plato, and especially of mathematical 
elements in Plato, which were clearly attracting considerable interest.10 
In general the interpretation of Plato is better seen in the Platonic Questions 
and in On the Psychogony in the Timaeus, neither of which is in dialogue form. 
The latter work names several sources, including the Academics Xenocrates and 
Crantor from the first and second generations after Plato himself, Eudorus of 
Alexandria, an Academic from the late first century BCE who also knew and 
approved of both these early exegetes,11 and Posidonius of Apamea, the Stoic 
polymath who influenced Cicero, Strabo and Seneca among others. Plutarch 
refers in fact to 'those around' Posidonius (1023b), a common way of referring 
to a given philosopher along with any others who may adopt his position; 
hence one may, but is not forced to, postulate a group of interpreters who 
agree with Posidonius' explanation of the construction of the Platonic World 
Soul. Posidonius' interpretation of Plato's psychology in the Timaeus is also 
referred to by Plutarch's contemporary Platonist, Theon of Smyrna,1 2 and by 
Sextus Empiricus, in whom it appears that Posidonius considered himself to be 
interpreting Pythagorean theory (seeing Plato's character 'Timaeus' as making 
a distinctively Pythagorean contribution, F85EK = S.E. M. 7.93). Posidonius 
(T91 = FI 51 EK) likewise attributed Platonic tripartite psychology to Pythagoras 
too. Finding Pythagoreanism in Plato would become a regular part of the phi­
losophy of the age, particularly for self-styled Pythagoreans.13 However, Galen 
9
 Aristotle's account of Plato's so-called 'unwritten doctrines' is clearly becoming important at this 
time, sufficiently so to have inspired an emendation to the text of Metaphysics by Eudorus and 
Euharmostus (Alex. Aphr. In Met. 58.31-59.8 = Eudorus T2 Mazzarelli). 
1 0
 There are mathematical passages scattered throughout Plutarch's Moralia (on which see below). 
while Theon of Smyrna and Moderatus are known to us mainly as a result of their mathematical 
and Pythagorean interests. 
1 1
 1013a—b; Eudorus is also mentioned at ioi9f—1020c. 
1 2
 Expos, p. 103 Hiller = F291 ΕΚ in relation to the seven numbers used in the construction of the 
World Soul. 
1 3
 Stob. Eel. 2.49.8fr.. possibly still influenced by Eudorus whose work is utilized shortly before: 
Aerius' (Stob. Eel. 1.12, 20. 22, 49; Ps.-Plut. 2.6, 4.2) as discussed in Tarrant 2000: 75—6; Moderatus 
at Porph. VPyth. 53, and Thrasyllus, Moderatus, Numenius and Cronius at idem VPlot. 20.71—6 
and 21.1-9; Nicomachus of Cerasa, and 'Pythagoras' in Lucian Auction of Lives 3-6. 
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makes use of Posidonius' defence of the tripartition of the soul in the course 
of approving the psychology of Plato's Republic, suggesting that Posidonius had 
admired Plato himself.14 The evidence suggests that Posidonius was an important 
figure in the history of Platonic interpretation, even though one cannot expect 
Platonic interpretation and doctrine to coincide in somebody who described 
himself as a Stoic. That is palpably the case in the 58th and 65th Epistles of 
Seneca, which give considerable insights into the Platonic interpretation of the 
time, and confirm the interest that a Stoic may legitimately take in Platonic 
texts. 
Eudorus is better entitled to be considered a Platonist, in spite of his sta-
tus as an 'Academic"5 and his own undoubted interest in the Pythagoreans. 
Consequently there was a time when scholars looked to Eudorus to explain a 
whole variety of common features in pre-Plotinian Platonism, and he occu-
pied, perhaps deservedly, twenty-two pages in Dillon's book The Middle Platon-
ists, sharing a chapter with Philo of Alexandria. John Rist was an early sceptic 
regarding what he saw as a still-growing tendency to credit unexplained doc-
trines to Eudorus,17 and a promised edition of Eudorus' fragments by Bonazzi 
and Chiaradonna appears set to take a minimalist view, particularly regarding 
material in the second Book of Stobaeus' Eclogues. Rejecting the Stobaean foun-
dations upon which much of what Eudorus' reputation as a Platonic interpreter 
rests would leave much of the recent scholarly picture of Eudorus without any 
real cohesion. There are also a few arguments from silence, and particularly from 
the silence of Proclus' commentaries,18 that warn us that he may just have been 
one figure among many of his time who played some part in giving shape to the 
new Platonism. We cannot even say what kind of philosopher he was. Does his 
interest in Pythagoreans imply more commitment than it had for Posidonius? 
Does his association with positive teachings imply the commitment to dogma 
that many postulate, or does the evidence show no more than it had done for 
14
 See F142—6 and 150—53 EK, from books 4—6 of On the Doctrines of Plato and Hippocrates. 
13
 Stobaeus Eel. 2.42.7 = T I Mazzarella Anon. 1, Intr. ad Amt. 97 Maass (= Til) , and Simpl. In Categ. 
187.TO (= T16). 
10
 See his account of Pythagorean metaphysical principles at Simpl. Phys. i8i.ioff., backed by his 
emendation of the text of Arist. Met. 988aio—11 (recorded by Alex. In Met.) so that the matter as 
well as Ideas are derived from the One; and, if Eudorus may be credited with the theory of the 
telos of Platonism at Stob. Ed. 2.49.8fr., one notes that Socrates and Plato are said to be following 
Pythagoras; finally, the closeness of aspects of Eudorus to some late Pythagorean texts has suggested 
to Dillon 1977: 117—21, among others, the influence of the Pythagoreanism of the period. The 
alleged similarities between Eudorus and Philo of Alexandria, who is once called a 'Pythagorean' 
by Clement (Strom. 2.19.100.3.4) and who is not otherwise directly associated with a philosophical 
school, also do something to suggest that Eudorus was a Pythagoreanizer. 
17
 See his review of Tarrant 1985, where he speaks of'Pan-Eudorism'. 
18
 As Proclus depends largely on Porphyry for his early material (Tarrant 2004), it seems that Porphyry 
too failed to see Eudorus as a central figure. 
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Philo of Larissa and Plutarch, who both expressed views of their own together 
while seeing some merit in Academic Scepticism? Do his objections to the 
Aristotelian account of the categories make him a trenchant anti-Aristotelian? 
Does the apparent fact that he wrote one or more Platonic commentaries make 
him a clear case of a 'Platonist', when Potamo, also of Alexandria, wrote on the 
Republicbut called himself an 'Eclectic'?19 
More importantly we have to ask whether Eudorus was really an innovator. 
On the composition of the Platonic World Soul he found something useful in 
two Old Academic views, but is not credited by Plutarch with a view of his 
own. Perhaps he is simply one of'those around Posidonius', but perhaps he said 
nothing that required reporting. Later (1020c) he is affirmed to be following 
Crantor on the mathematics of the soul's harmonic nature, and the reason why 
he has been reintroduced at 1019e is the clarity of his exposition. Was he perhaps 
more of an interpreter than a philosopher, or more of a scholar than an original 
mind? There are a few key doctrines that scholars like to credit him with, 
including the view that 'assimilation to God' is the human goal, that the Ideas 
are the thoughts of God, and that the world demands not only transcendent 
Ideas (in the Platonic tradition) but also immanent forms (in the Aristotelian 
tradition). The first is clearly and interestingly discussed in the Stobaean passage 
that allegedly follows him, but we may detect the basic doctrine in Ciceronian 
texts that go back to Antiochus if not before, and Plato gives plenty of prompting 
in this direction (cf. De leg. 1.21). The second is quite plausibly Old Academic. 
The third is already present in Platonic material in Seneca (Epistles 58 and 65), 
and Whittaker (1969), with an eye on Eudorus, favoured a source commenting 
on the Timaeus, but Plutarch's discussion of Posidonius' interpretation of the 
World Soul certainly gives prominence both to intelligibles and to the limits of 
physical bodies (as distinct from their matter). 
The evidence points to Eudorus having given momentum to the Platonist 
movement not by the striking originality of his doctrines but by his ability 
to explain clearly the concepts that belonged to an earlier age. In this regard 
he was continuing in the footsteps of Posidonius. We cannot even affirm that 
Eudorus would have regarded himself as a 'Platonist', however appropriate the 
term seems. If that disappoints our desire to identify a Platonic visionary at 
this time, then it may simply be that our desire is misplaced. What was really 
important is widespread admiration for Plato and the breadth of the desire to 
understand him. It made his philosophy a regular topic of conversation at the 
more serious gatherings of intellectuals. The texts that we have reflect a vibrant 
intellectual background, and it is to them that we must turn. 
19
 See D.L. 1.21 for his philosophy and the Suda ad loc. for his commentary. 
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5 PRESENTING AND EXPLAINING THE CORPUS 
The most important text for Platonism is the text of Plato himself. Some works 
had clearly remained quite well known throughout the Hellenistic period, 
including Timaeus, Phaedo and Republic. However, the Hellenistic scholar Aristo-
phanes of Byzantium had arranged only fifteen works when he sought to shape 
the corpus, along dramatic lines, into trilogies.20 These fifteen included the 
Minos and Epinomis, which are almost certainly spurious, and a group of Epis-
tles, some of which may have been. They gave no exposure (apart from the 
Euthyphro) to what we think of as the Socratic side of Plato, with its focus on 
undermining the theses or activities of others rather than on establishing central 
theses. His arrangement did not have the effect of leaving all the rest of the 
corpus in obscurity, but debates in the first century BCE about the nature of 
the Platonic heritage, and in particular about how far Plato had sanctioned the 
straightforward exposition of doctrine, needed answering with reference to a 
comprehensive and authoritative body of texts. Such a corpus may have existed, 
but seems not to have been widely circulating or adequately explained. 
We can say better who was trying to explain the whole corpus than who 
was helping to make it more freely available. But certain works now being 
written presuppose the availability of comprehensive texts. We have a short 
introduction, or Prologue, to the full corpus by the second-century CE Platonist 
Albinus, and the first of three appendices to Diogenes Laertius' Life of Plato (D.L. 
3.48-67) is also just such an introduction. Both refer to the work of Thrasyllus, 
who appears, directly or indirectly, to be Diogenes' principal source, but is 
criticized by Albinus. Albinus (Prol. 4) accuses Thrasyllus (court intellectual of 
the Emperor Tiberius in the early first century CE) and Dercyllides (of unknown 
date) of having placed dramatic considerations ahead of substantive ones when 
arranging the corpus into nine tetralogies. So as far as Albinus was concerned, 
one or the other of these two must take responsibility for the form of the thirty-
six-work corpus that has come down to us.21 We know too from an Arabic 
source (al-Nadïm, Fihrist, p. 614 Dodge) that Theon of Smyrna, a Platonist of 
distinctly mathematical interests whose Exposition of Mathematics Useful for the 
Understanding of Plato has come down to us, wrote at some time in the late 
first or early second century CE on the order and titles of Plato's dialogues. 
The Exposition refers both to the harmonic theory of Thrasyllus and to an 
20
 Republic-Timaeus—Critias; Sophist-Statesman-Cratylus; Laws—Minos—Epinomis; Tlteaetetus-Euthyphro-
Apology; Crito—Phaedo—Epistles. 
21
 Certainly not everything associated with Thrasyllus was new, and there appears to have been some 
early tradition that the corpus had been originally arranged like a sequence of tragedies at the 
Dionysia, but Albinus knew no earlier tetralogies than those that he associated with these two. 
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interpretative work by Dercyllides on the spindles and whorls of the 'Myth 
of Er' in Plato's Republic. It is therefore likely that one or the other was the 
primary inspiration (but not necessarily 'source') of Theon's own activities in 
introducing the corpus. 
The place of Thrasyllus in organizing the corpus is controversial, but the role 
of Dercyllides is still more difficult to fix, since we cannot affirm where he stood 
in relation to Thrasyllus. All we can be certain of is that he recognized the same 
first tetralogy, consisting of Euthyphro, Apology, Crito and Phaedo. However, he 
addressed the Platonic theory of matter in the eleventh book of a work On Plato's 
Philosophy, and it may be with this extensive work about Plato in mind that 
Dillon is content to treat him as a Platonist.22 This contrasts with a widespread 
unwillingness to use this term for Thrasyllus, even though a scholiast on Juvenal 
affirmed that he had devoted himself to the Platonica secta.2ì If Thrasyllus leaned 
at times towards the Pythagoreans, this may simply reflect an alliance that was 
typical of the age, and the claims of these two to be regarded as Platonists are 
approximately equal. 
Dercyllides unearthed his material on Platonic matter from Hermodorus, an 
Old Academic and contemporary of Xenocrates, and this recalls the way that 
Posidonius and Eudorus were taking Old Academic texts into consideration 
in the interpretation of Plato. Even though Hermodorus is responsible for the 
outline of the theory, Dercyllides is still selecting the views that he will promote, 
still convinced like other Platonists of the age that Plato had a theory of matter, 
and still writing in a way that suggested an interpretation of the receptacle in 
the Timaeus, the Indefinite (apeiron) of Philebus 23c ffi, and Aristotle's reports of 
Plato's 'unwritten doctrine'. Among the ideas that Dercyllides sees fit to pass 
on here is the notion that Plato worked with a system of three basic categories, 
'in itself, 'relative to an opposite' and 'relative to another'. So, a Platonist 
system of first principles is beginning to take place, closely related to a Platonist 
logic. 
Both Dercyllides and Thrasyllus seem not only to have been involved in 
organizing the corpus but also to have been attempting to explain how phi-
losophy in the Platonic tradition operated. Among the material in Diogenes 
that arguably derives from Thrasyllus' stance is the claim that Plato did establish 
doctrines, revealing them only in the instructional (huphëgëtikos) works, while 
inquisitive (zëtëtikos) works aimed rather to refute. This major division was cen-
tral to a classification by the dialogue's so-called character, which resulted in four 
22
 Dillon (1977: 133) places him in the milieu of Alexandrian Platonism, and (2006: 20—2) treats him 
in the company of Platonists without further ado. 
23
 Scholion onjuv. 6.576 = Thrasyllus Tia. 
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species of instructional works (physical, logical, ethical, political) and four of 
inquisitive also (perhaps for 'testing' the youth, for 'delivering' their own inner 
theories, for 'exposing' the sophists, and for 'overturning' them) , 2 4 The classi­
fication must have originated with persons who saw two strands in the Platonic 
tradition, one doctrinal and the other more aporetic. As if to further explain 
the disputes about interpreting Plato, the material in Diogenes suggests that he 
had deliberately concealed some of his meaning by using a plurality of terms in 
the same sense, and the same terms in different senses. This not only involves 
interpretation, but establishes that Plato was a complex author who required 
interpretation. 
Much of the significance of Dercyllides and Thrasyllus might have been lost, 
but for the scholarly activities of Porphyry, inherited from his early mentor 
Longinus. It had been Porphyry who passed information about Dercyllides and 
Hermodorus to Simplicius, and Porphyry was in general a major source of pre-
Plotinian material for Platonists of later antiquity. Porphyry himself shows how 
Longinus had been able to place Plotinus in the same tradition as Thrasyllus 
and Pythagorean authors like Moderatus and Numenius (VPlot. 20—1), seeing 
him as somebody who dealt with the basic principles of Plato and Pythagoras 
together. Porphyry also preserves something about a Thrasyllan 'Logos of the 
forms' in his Commentary on Ptolemy's Harmonics.25 One assumes that Thrasyllus 
had tried in a work on harmonics to relate the logos qua ratio of Pythagorean 
harmonics to some universal principle, associated with a controlling divinity, 
which is somehow responsible for embracing all the formal principles of the 
natural world. Porphyry has this logos not only unfolding the formal power 
encapsulated in seeds, but also underpinning a cognitive process that extracts 
the forms from matter and eventually yields an awareness of the Platonic Idea. 
But it is only the beginning of the process that is marked as Thrasyllan, and 
all one can say with confidence is that Thrasyllus had some /qs?05-theory that 
involved formal principles, and that Porphyry thought it special enough to refer 
to. The fact that Porphyry has strayed a long way from his goal of commenting 
on Ptolemy and thus seems to be following a source, coupled with the facts that 
he has stated a policy of naming sources and that no other source is mentioned, 
led me to conclude that most of this material was broadly Thrasyllan. If this 
were right the passage would be especially notable for two reasons: first, such 
a logos-theory inevitably makes one think of Thrasyllus' contemporary Philo of 
Alexandria, and second the passage contains allusions to doctrinal material in 
2 4
 There are uncertainties here, as can be seen from the variant epideiktikos replacing endeiktikos at 
Albinus, Prol. 6. 
2 5
 Page τ 2 During. 
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the sixth and seventh Platonic Epistles, material that is otherwise unnoticed in 
extant works until the second century CE. 
The activities of those who undertook the organization of the corpus did 
not ensure that all works included by them were accepted as Plato's own. The 
Epinomis was still attributed to Philip of Opus, while the authorship of such 
works as the Alcibiades II, Hipparchus and Erastae were all apparently debated 
during this period. 2 6 There is no evidence, however, that any were omitted 
from the corpus arrangements that have come down to us, including two in 
Arabic sources (one seemingly derived from the work of Theon referred to 
above) and the Prologue of Albinus. Other Platonists seem to have had few 
doubts about works other than these four. 
The activities of the corpus organizers made little impact on some Platonist 
authors of the period. Plutarch, the anonymous Theaetetus commentator and 
Alcinous show little or no awareness of the activities of Thrasyllus and 
Dercyllides.27 O n the other hand a second-century papyrus recently published, 
and perhaps from another commentary on the Tlieaetetus, offers an explanation 
of the internal cohesion of the second tetralogy. It explains particularly the 
special non-dogmatic character of the Theaetetus, as opposed to the preceding 
Cratylus and the following Sophist and Politicus, in terms of Plato's desire to 
counter erroneous positions on epistemology before explaining the rest of his 
theory. What is said suggests conformity also with Thrasyllus' second titles, as 
Cratylus is about the correctness of names, and Theaetetus about knowledge; it 
also agrees with the depiction of the Cratylus, Sophist and Statesman as 'logical' 
dialogues, i.e., dialogues offering instruction in logic. 
The kind of Platonism associated with Thrasyllus, Dercyllides and Theon had 
been learned rather than edifying, and certainly not inspired. It had tended to 
see mathematics (including harmonics), and therefore mathematical passages in 
Plato, as a principal concern. However, these authors do show a clear awareness 
of the metaphysical element in Plato, in Thrasyllus' logos-theory, in Dercyllides' 
treatment of Platonic matter, and in Theon's comparison of philosophy to a 
sacred rite (Expos. 14.18—16.2), which uses the mystery terminology of the 
Phaedrus and aims at the goal of assimilation to the divine. This brings us to 
2 6
 For the Epinomis see D.L. 3.37. anon. Proleg. 13—19; for Hipparchus and Alcibiades II see Aelian 
VS 8.2.16, Athenaeus 6.506c. and Tarrant T993: 17 n. 37. 150-1; for the Erastae see perhaps even 
Thrasyllus τ ι8c ( = D.L. 9.37). 
2 7
 The technical terms for the classification of dialogues are absent, so far as may be told, from 
the commentator's discussion of the nature and primary topic of the Theaetetus in columns 2—3 : 
they appear to have no explanatory value for Plutarch; and Alcinous. discussing which types of 
syllogism Plato employs in which situations, uses the term huphëgëtikos for dialogue character at 
158.28 without importing the rest of the classification. 
Platonism before Plotinus 79 
the threshold of a fully revived Platonism that depicts Plato as the builder of a 
doctrinal system. 
6 MOVING FORWARD 
The central author in the next part of our account will be Plutarch. Even so, 
we should perhaps begin with reference to the 58th and 65th Epistles of Seneca, 
which reveal to us some features of the developing Platonist metaphysics. Epistle 
65 discusses the types of causes acknowledged by various schools, and at 7-10 
Plato is considered to have added a fifth cause to the four familiar Aristotelian 
ones, a paradigmatic cause (or Idea) over and above final, motive, formal and 
material causes. This already gives the basic five-cause system that is present even 
in the introduction to Proclus' Commentary on the Timaeus,2S and one might well 
believe that it was present in interpretative works on the Timaeus before Seneca; 
but it may simply be that Seneca draws primarily on the familiar wisdom of 
the intellectual world at Rome. It is plausible that Thrasyllus had exercised 
a controlling influence on the way in which Plato's philosophy was seen in 
Roman circles, particularly those close to the imperial household.2 9 Since, as a 
Stoic, Seneca does not approve such multi-cause systems, it is unlikely to be his 
own innovation. 
A division into six of Plato s senses of'what is' in Epistle 58 is compatible with 
the metaphysic of the five-cause passage. One recalls how the corpus organizers 
were conscious of Plato's tendency to use terms in a plurality of senses (D.L. 
3.63—4), and the division in this Epistle should be seen against that background. 
We have a generic sense of being, referring to everything that may be said to 
'be', and five others. These five again suggest a metaphysical hierarchy. Again, 
the material seems related to the interpretation of the Timaeus, particularly to 
the famous question that launches Timaeus' monologue: 'What is it that always 
is and has no becoming?' (27d),3° but Seneca may here too be indebted to 
contemporary intellectual debate, and one feels that details are at times being 
understood in distinctly Stoic terms. 
2
 In Tim. 1.2.30—4.5; note that an auxiliary or instrumental cause is sometimes added (as in Porphyry 
fr. 120), but this does not alter the shape of the basic five-cause system. 
2 9
 If Thrasyllus is still the source of Porphyry at Harm. 13.21—14.29, where the leap to the Idea is 
again an 'add-on', it is worth noting the influence of the philosophical digression οι Epistle 7 there 
alluded to, which actually calls the Idea 'the fifth', and sees it as offering a step-up beyond the four 
elements there involved in empirical cognition. For a passage in Plutarch that makes much of hints 
of a five-fold metaphysic in Plato, see Mor. 391b—d. 
3 0
 The question gives impetus to Numenius' metaphysical discussion in On the Good, frs. 3—6. and 
Ammonius' contribution to discussion of the Delphic E (below); cf. Whittaker 1965. 
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7 THE PLACE OF ALCINOUS 
As one moves towards the authors of the second century Alcinous becomes 
increasingly important because of the range of philosophical topics he covers. 
Of Alcinous we know nothing except the name by which his Handbook of 
Platonism or Didascalicus has come down to us. We do not even know whether 
the name is that by which its bearer had originally been known, or, like the 
names of Porphyry and others,3 1 a name acquired by a non-Greek within a 
philosophical school. What concerns us here is the nature of his handbook, the 
date at which it was put together, and the date(s) from which its basic materials 
are derived. Alcinous is clearly trying to produce from disparate materials a 
reasonably coherent introductory doctrinal handbook, as can be seen at the 
close: 
To have said this much suffices for an introduction (eisagöge) to Platonic doctrine-building 
(dogmatopoieid). Perhaps parts of it have been stated in an organized fashion, and parts as 
they came up and without order, but [it has been presented] so that as a result of what 
has been stated we may become keen to study and discover the rest of his doctrines too. 
This suggests that he is conscious that his materials have not produced an organic 
whole, but that this does not worry him because he is only setting students upon 
a Platonic path, in recognition that Platonism is a life's journey and cannot come 
neatly packaged in Epicurean fashion. 
Alcinous is certainly following a source closely at the beginning of his exposi-
tion of Platonic physics (12.1), where the similarities with a passage (in Stobaeus) 
of Arius Didymus can scarcely be coincidental. At other times much less striking 
similarities with Apuleius' De Platone also suggest some common source. It has 
been argued by Góransson that Alcinous is not following a single source but a 
number of sources,32 and there certainly seem to be a number of different layers 
of material in the work. Parts of it are laced with vocabulary that emphasize the 
author's agreement or disagreement with certain ways of reading Plato, which 
do not appear to be the kind ofthing that is preserved when following sources. 
These parts, including the end of the section on logic where interpretations 
of the Euthydemus, Parmenides and Cratylus are suggested (end of 6), chapters 
7—11 on mathematics and metaphysics, chapters 23—5 on psychology, and parts 
of the earlier chapters on ethics (27—30), deal with the dominant interests of 
31
 There are interesting cases of adopted names in Porphyry's Life of Plotinus, since the author had 
been known (i) by the transliteration of his own name under Longinus, (ii) by its translation into 
Greek by Amelius. and (lii) by a word that suggested royalty more obliquely under Plotinus (17). 
Amelius' name had been changed to suit a philosopher who exalted the One, making it Amerios 
('Partless'. 7). while Amelius bestowed the name Mikkalos on Paulinus (also 7). 
32
 Góransson 1995. 
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second-century Platonism, with a greater interest in hermeneutics and a more 
pervasive interest in theology and psychology. Some of these parts cannot accu­
rately be called 'introductory', for there is little point in discussing what the 
Cratylus really means for anybody unfamiliar with the content of the dialogue 
itself, and little point in going into what one believes to be the human good 
'if one accurately understands his writings' unless the reader already has a basic 
familiarity with Plato. There is also little obvious point in including as an 
appendix to the theology some twenty-three lines (166.15—38) on how one 
proves the qualities to be incorporeal without offering any reason for the reader 
to be interested in such issues. 
Finally, one would expect a single coherent handbook of doctrines to be 
arranged in accordance with the division of Platonic philosophy that was offered 
at the outset. However, the actual arrangement differs considerably from that 
outlined in chapter 3 (153.25—154.5). Here there is a fundamental triparti-
tion into theoretical—practical—logical. Logic is divided into division, definition, 
induction and syllogistic. Practice is divided into ethics, 'economics' (or family 
management) and politics. Theory is divided into theology (studying unmoved 
objects), physics (studying the heavens and the physical world) and mathematics. 
In what follows theory precedes practice, and comes in the order mathematics-
theology—physics. There is no discussion of'economics' or of definition per se. 
The account is preceded by an elaborate discussion of Plato's criterion (episte-
mology), a section on analytics (if it should not be restored at 153.31) is added 
to the logic, an extensive section of Platonic psychology and a chapter on fate 
are added after the discussion of physics, and there is a chapter before the close 
on the sophist, based closely on Plato's Sophist. It may have been prompted by 
the final lines of the preceding section on politics (188.5—11), which are based 
primarily on the Statesman, and, with the end of chapter 6 (159.38—160.41), it 
reflects a strong interest in the so-called 'logical' dialogues of Plato: Cratylus, 
Sophist, Statesman and Parmenides, with the addition of the Euthydemus?3 This 
in turn suggests a desire to give Plato as 'scientific' an image as possible. We 
shall discuss Alcinous' doctrines and date as we progress. 
8 PLUTARCH 
Plutarch is another figure requiring separate discussion. Though he is better 
known for his biographies, which themselves serve to illustrate moral lessons, 
3 3
 The names of these dialogues occur eight times in all in the text, while those of other dialogues are 
mentioned only a further fourteen times. The source of D.L. 3.50—1 includes only the first four as 
being of the 'logical character', Albinus Prologue 3 seems to agree, but Galen included his summary 
of the Euthydemus along with those of the other four in his first book of Compendia. 
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and therefore have their own quasi-philosophical purpose, we possess several 
wide-ranging works addressing philosophical and related issues more directly. 
It has already been argued that Plutarch is a central figure in early imperial 
Platonism, and for this reason he is deserving of careful attention. However, 
there are a variety of difficulties involved in studying him, many of them similar 
to the difficulties that we experience when reading Plato. Both are literary 
authors, and Plutarch frequently casts his best work in dialogue form, making 
it clearer what he thinks worth discussing than what doctrines he adhered to. He 
is also cautious, finding something in common with the New Academy even 
though it is quite clear that he finds no reason whatever to avoid either belief 
or commitment. 
Fortunately Plutarch sometimes speaks himself within his dialogues, allowing 
one to be clearer where the author stands. In the E at Delphi he is the penultimate 
speaker to offer an explanation of why the epsilon has been inscribed on Apollo's 
temple, and takes second place to his teacher Ammonius, who offers the final 
and seemingly definitive account, taking the E to stand for an affirmation of 
the god's unqualified 'existence' beyond the realm of generation in the form of 
the address ει ('you are'). Plutarch in this work is still depicted as a young man, 
but his preference for a mathematical explanation (taking the E as the number 
5) is carefully linked not only with Pythagoreanizing speculations about the 
properties of this number, but also with an interpretation of passages from the 
later dialogues of Plato (391b—c), including the Sophist and Philebus. We see here 
evidence of Plutarch's early puzzling over some of the most enigmatic passages 
of Plato, trying to understand them in relation to one another. 
Ordinarily the view that Plutarch espouses in person will coincide with his 
interpretation of Plato, and without forcing the Platonic text available to him. 
Thus he is a natural Platonist, who has little difficulty understanding the world 
in which he lives in Platonist terms. The most obvious way in which Plutarch 
bears witness to the revival of what is recognizably 'Platonism' is in his open 
commitment to the supernatural. Since Hellenistic philosophy there had been 
no shortage of theology, but the clear tendency had been to regard god(s) as part 
of an organic whole, the natural world, typified in the Stoic identification of 
god and nature. There is no evidence that we have moved significantly beyond 
this in Eudorus or Thrasyllus, for example. With Plutarch, committed to the 
validity of Greek religious traditions through his role as priest at Delphi, a great 
deal of additional divine machinery becomes necessary to explain the proper 
functioning of oracles, dreams and the like. 
A famous passage of Plato's Symposium (202d—203a) had sought to explain 
prophecy through daimones, a multifarious tribe of beings responsible for bridg­
ing a gulf between humans and gods. Plutarch introduces this theme early in 
his important discussion of daimones in The Obsolescence of Oracles (415a), and 
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the daimones here (416c) differ significantly from gods insofar as they share in 
the non-rational emotions (pathe) of humans, and consequently also in degrees 
of virtue (417b). Their intermediate nature is said to parallel that of the moon, 
between earth and sun (416e),34 and for Plutarch their place is essential in order 
to avoid either a radical division between gods and humans or an insufficient 
distance to separate them, so that gods actually come to be present personally 
at religious rites (4161^417^. It is also vital to explain the uncivilized rituals 
of early or remote humans, for Plutarch follows Greek traditions in accepting 
the impeccable rationality of anything that can properly be called a god. Hence 
his character Cleombrotus piously claims that unseemly myths also tell of the 
exploits of daimones rather than of gods. It is to the vagaries of these daimones 
that he would attribute temporary desertion of oracular shrines. When this 
subject is revived at 431b with a request for an explanation of how the dai-
mones are responsible for the operation of oracles, Plutarch's teacher Ammonius 
is allowed to suggest that daimones are in fact only souls clothed in air,35 and 
that we need no explanation for the contact of soul upon soul. At this point 
Lamprias, the narrator and Plutarch's brother, comes in to argue that souls with 
special prophetic powers after death are only retaining gifts that they had in 
life, but whose power was often swamped by its immersion in the bodily world 
(431e—4321). Prophetic souls are those most responsive to the required external 
impulses, including physical ones such as vapours, and prophecy, at Delphi or 
elsewhere, is not attributable to any process of reasoning (432c—d). Appeals to 
the legacy of the Academy and an aporetic (but not despairing) conclusion warn 
us that Plutarch desires to keep an open mind. What has been important is the 
overall kind of discussion rather than its details. 
At the beginning of the treatise On Isis and Osiris is an address to the priestess 
Clea that explains Plutarch's indecision (351c—d): 
Sensible people, Clea, must ask for all good things from the gods. We go on to pray 
especially to obtain from their very selves as much knowledge about them as humans 
can achieve, thinking there is nothing greater for humans to receive nor more sacred 
for a god to grant than the truth. God makes a present of the rest of their needs, but 
to intelligence and wisdom he grants access, keeping and using these as his own proper 
possessions. 
Knowledge is the very source of god's power and happiness, and our quest to 
'assimilate ourselves to god as much as possible'36 is a quest for knowledge, 
34
 This association of daimones with the moon is present also in the more imaginative treatise On the 
Face of the Moon 944c—d. 
35
 Here one should look not only to Hes. Erg. 123—5 for a precedent, but also now to the Derveni 
Papyrus 6.2—3. cf. 9—10; their airy nature may be inferred if editors correctly restore the beginning 
of line 11, but also perhaps from the airy nature of Zeus and other divinities in the exegetical parts 
of the text. 
36
 The human goal or telos in Plutarch (Mor. 55od—e. cf. 1015b) as elsewhere in later Platonism. 
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especially knowledge about gods (351e). Plutarch may speak as one who has 
travelled part of the road, but no human can speak with the authority of one 
who has himself reached the desired knowledge. As a result Plutarch will yield 
much space in his dialogues to others who have made it their business to search 
for the truth, but to none does he allot a wholly authoritative position. In this 
regard he does not shun all signs of disagreement with Plato, particularly where 
the Platonic evidence is not wholly consistent. This is evident in the Eroticus 
or Love Dialogue. Here the divinity of Eros, which Socrates and 'Diotima' 
forcefully argue against in Plato's Symposium (20ie-202d), is a central plank in the 
argument. It is even claimed that philosophers and poets are in agreement about 
Eros' divinity (363 e-f), specifically mentioning Plato and alluding rather to a 
variety of material in the Phaedrus where Love is said to be 'a god or something 
divine' (24262). Further, Plutarch's own experience of a loving marriage has 
ensured the denial of some of the recurrent themes of the Symposium, such 
as the superior nature of male-to-male love, an idea still associated with some 
Platonists in the second century CE. 3 7 Plutarch treats all loving relationships as 
being on a par. 
In the context of an increasing willingness to introduce non-Greek material 
into broadly Platonist discussions, a willingness that will be continued by N u m e ­
nius, Iamblichus and Syrianus later, it is important that Plutarch himself in the 
Eroticus makes use of comparisons with Egyptian muthologia, which according to 
762a preserves scattered traces of the truth. The very word muthologia suggests 
the presence of a rational message embedded in a story, and hence inaccessible 
without deep interpretation. After a request at 764a, Egyptian thoughts on love 
are introduced. Central to this is the analogy of Eros and Aphrodite to the sun 
and moon respectively, which hints at the lack-lustre nature of sexual activity 
without love (764a). But Plutarch with his usual caution warns of ways in which 
the analogy is less appropriate (e.g., 764e). Again the central myth-like passage of 
the Phaedrus (244a-256e), which like Plutarch's work may be seen as apologetic 
for Eros, underpins the discussion, with Eros regarded as the source of, or catalyst 
in, our being returned from the image of beauty here to the true beauty beyond. 
The result is that the foray into Egyptian religion remains rooted in Platonism. 
Egyptian muthologia is tackled at much greater length in On Isis and Osiris, and 
Plutarch warns that it should not be taken literally (355b), but in the manner of 
those who approach myths 'in a holy and philosophical fashion' (355c!). A hint 
of what this might be is given at 359a: like a rainbow that reflects the light of 
the sun, so the muthos reflects a kind of logos that turns back the mind to other, 
3 7
 See 'Ion' in Lucian, Symposium or Lapiths 39; more subtle by far is Taurus 10 τ = Aulus Gellius 
NA 17.20.1-7. 
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encountered more directly after death. Even though Plutarch offers advice and 
instruction to a lady willing to be guided, he has felt it necessary to work through 
a whole range of theories beginning with the less sophisticated, giving them 
consideration but subjecting them to criticism, and working gradually towards 
the Platonizing account that he prefers. Though intended to be instructive, 
the treatise is methodologically an Academic investigation: perhaps because he 
considers method to be part of the lesson communicated. 
In like manner his treatise on the daimonion of Socrates builds up towards 
the preferred account, which occurs shortly before the end of an action-packed 
dialogue, is delivered by Socrates' friend Simmias of Thebes, and includes 
the story of Timarchus' vision at the Oracle of Trophonius. According to 
the theory set out here Socrates' daimonion was not a unique phenomenon, 
but a case of an uncorrupted and dispassionate intellect, left in contact with 
a part that floats on high while the rest of his soul is submerged in matter. 
This illuminates him with a daimonic light (daimonion phengos) for sensing the 
rationally expressed but voice-free communications of his daimôn, intellect being 
touched from without by a superior intellect. Contact with the original source 
of the thought makes linguistic structures irrelevant images (588d—589c). Since 
the whole theory concerns the individual's personal daimôn, and this daimôn is 
intellectual and 'outside' (thurathen, 589b) impacting upon the purest and most 
receptive intellect inside, it is difficult not to suspect the influence of Aristotle's 
external active intellect of De anima 3.5. 
The story of Timarchus serves to give a vivid cosmic setting to the body-
free intellects, giving them pinpoints of light and placing them around the 
moon, with gods in the planets above them. These separated intellects are 
rightly called daimones because of their external nature (591e), but each is an 
individual's daimôn, with a direct line connecting it to the highest internal part 
of the individual over whom it watches. 
Apuleius a little later will make the tutelary daimôn a third kind, distinct 
from both the mind within (which is sometimes called daimôn) and from the 
spirits of the dead (De deo Socratis 150—6). Following a tradition already found 
in Philo (Gig. 6—9) Apuleius had argued that daimones uniquely fulfil the role 
of the proper dwellers of the air (DDS 137—41), while Alcinous too is ready to 
associate classes of super-human beings with particular elements,38 but Plutarch 
avoids simple material connections while assuming that the air is the medium 
38
 Didasc. 15; the term seems to have been used here in a more general sense, embracing the heavenly 
bodies (171.15) and perhaps the Earth itself (171.27-34), which might explain a daimonic presence 
in all elements (as might Epinomis 984d—985c). not the air alone. Nothing, however, prevents 
an animate being from passing outside its own characteristic element, like a sea-bird (properly 
terrestrial) flying and diving. 
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through which the intellect on high is able to make connection with the 
internal intellect below (589c). Plutarch's theory of daimones is complex, lacking 
the attempt that these later authors make to be systematic, but consequently 
allowing more scope for explaining the beliefs and practices of forefathers and 
overseas friends alike. It is not surprising that Plutarch often talks of the vice 
of superstition (deisidaimonia, literally 'worrying about daimones'), devoting a 
whole treatise to it and distinguishing it from piety. 
Plutarch is best known among later Platonists as a champion of literal creation. 
Surprisingly for one who employs allegorical interpretation of other religions, 
he is not keen to interpret Plato non-literally except where poetic language 
clearly demands it (On Isis and Osiris 3701). Hence he avoids appealing to 
Socratic irony in the Theaetetus (Platonic Questions 999c), or to the status of 
Timaeus' cosmology as a muthos. His relative literalism caused later interpreters 
such as Proclus to see him, perhaps unfairly, as a precursor of the more rigorous 
literalism of Atticus later in the second century. A statement at On the Procreation 
of the Soul in the Timaeus 1014a appeals to principles of interpretation that 
recognize the unusual nature of the work to be interpreted, but seeks to get 
around the difficulties by a further appeal to 'what is likely' (to eikos) and to 
details of the language. The tactic would appear legitimate in view of Plutarch's 
conviction that earlier interpreters have gone far beyond the reasonable bounds 
of interpretation in seeking to get around the idea that the World Soul was 
brought into being (1013d—e). 
Plutarch is committed to the idea that the supreme god is both father (i.e., 
the one to give life from himself) and creator of the world (Timaeus 28c; Platonic 
Questions ioooe), but this does not entail that everything must derive from him. 
Rather he regularly affirms that both unordered bodily matter and unintelligent 
soul have always existed, and that the creation involves the giving of intelligence 
by god to soul followed by souls' organization of body (Platonic Questions 1003 a, 
On the Procreation of the Soul in the Timaeus 1014a—c). In this way the creator 
may be the artificer of beauty and goodness, and anything ugly or evil may 
be attributed to the original motive impulse of soul, saving Plutarch what he 
perceives as the folly of attributing evil either to a good god or to unqualified 
matter, or perhaps to the Stoic 'consequence' (epakolouthësis, 1015a—c). His 
original chaotic matter he finds in the Receptacle of the Timaeus (now looking 
less like Isis!),39 while the original chaotic soul is detected in the Indeterminate 
(apeiron) of the Philebus, the Divisible nature at Timaeus 35a (identified with 
39
 Plutarch is aware that there is potential confusion because original soul may be described homony-
mously as 'matter' and 'substrate' (10221), and because the receptacle itself includes irrational motion 
that must be attributed to soul (1014b). But note that neither here nor in On Isis and Osiris is it 
suggested that Plato's Receptacle is evil. 
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Necessity), the soul responsible for evil at Laws 10.896e—898c, and the 'innate 
desire' (sumphutos epithumia) of Statesman 2j2e6 (On the Procreation of the Soul in 
the Timaeus 1014a—1015b). So the creator is the author of the universal order 
or cosmos rather than the creator of the 'stuffs' that made up that cosmos, and it 
is for him this cosmos (as other Platonic works are held to show) that Plato calls 
'generated' (ioi7b-d).4° 
Plutarch's care over developing a coherent interpretation of Plato that also 
underpinned his philosophical agenda did not prevent most of his successors 
disagreeing with him. The tendency was for subsequent Platonists to distinguish 
ways of saying the world was 'generated' (genëtos) that did not imply its creation 
in time. The most thorough surviving treatment of the issue is that of Taurus, 
happily preserved in Philoponus' On the Eternity of the World 6.8 (= Taurus 22 τ 
and 23 F). Besides the obvious sense of'generated', Taurus distinguished things 
of the generated type (though never actually generated); of composite structure 
(though never actually composed); in generation (though never not so); or 
eternally dependent on a generating cause. Whether or not he was influenced 
by Aristotle, Taurus himself preferred to adopt the Peripatetic position that the 
world was eternal, and that its literal creation would mean its susceptibility to 
destruction (cf. De caelo 1.12). 
The position adopted by Alcinous also differs from that of Plutarch insofar 
as he denies that 'generated' means there was ever a time when there was no 
cosmos, and he appears to accept both the last two senses of Taurus (14.169.32-
5); however, he goes on immediately to offer a picture of the creator who 
awakens a slumbering World Soul (soul of the cosmos!), turning it towards 
himself, so that on viewing the intelligible Ideas within him it may receive the 
forms (eidë kai morphas, 169.35—41). This may seem close to Plutarch's view 
that creation is the ordering of what has been hitherto unordered, but it differs 
in preserving the denial that there had been a pre-cosmic state of soul or even 
body. Instead Alcinous is postulating a period or periods where the organizing 
power within the world experiences something akin to a hangover or coma 
(hôsper ek karou tinos batheos ë hupnou). This presumably involves something akin 
to the universe of Plato's Statesman, with a world whose internal forces send it 
from time to time into a state of forgetfulness (273C6) and perplexity (273d5) 
until, before its collapse, the god resumes the helm. Much the same position has 
been adopted as an explicit compromise by the relatively late second-century 
Platonist Severus (6 τ), who makes the cosmos ungenerated in the simplest sense, 
4 0
 One consideration qualifies Plutarch's picture of a generated cosmos, and that is his endorsement 
of the Statesman's picture of alternating cycles of order and degeneration (269c—274d); but even 
in Plato there is a suggestion that the cyclic universe is itself engendered by a divinity (269dl. 
269d8-9). 
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though its successive phases - and successive orders - are generated. What 
Alcinous and Severus have perhaps tried to achieve is a position where an eternal 
universe could be postulated without making god's providence, affirmed earlier 
at 12.167.13, redundant. The threat that providence would become redundant 
is one of the principal fears that caused Atticus to insist on a generated universe 
(fis. 4.9, 13), as if providential care could never be offered to a self-sufficient 
being, only to an entity that owed its very existence to the carer. As Dillon has 
observed (1977: 253), his customary hostility towards Aristotle means that 'the 
logical problems raised by Aristotle bother Atticus not at all'. 
Providence is something that Platonists cannot compromise on, found as it is 
in a vital passage (3ob6-ci) of the all-important Timaeus, where the cosmos is 
said to have become ensouled and intelligent thanks to god's providence. Hence 
it is part of the very discussion of the world's generation that is central to the 
debate over generation. Proclus' discussion of this passage (In Tim. 1.415.19-
416.5), perhaps ultimately dependent on Porphyry, seems to belong to pre-
Plotinian times, beginning with Plutarch, alluding also to the Chaldaean Oracles, 
and at times reminding one of Numenius' distinction between the demiurge and 
a superior but inert nous-god that also functions as the Good. Plutarch (fr. 15) 
is here credited, it seems, with the view that the demiurge is correctly named 
'providence' (pro-noia), because though he is intelligence (nous) he contains 
within him something over and above intelligence. Talk of the correctness of 
names indicates that the broad etymological strategies of the Cratylus are being 
employed, that noia is taken to indicate nous, and that pronoia is being taken 
to indicate something prior, and hence superior, to nous: or at least to nous 
as normally conceived. Being a fairly conservative Platonist Plutarch can only 
have had in mind the Idea of the Good of Plato's Republic, which is superior 
to knowledge, truth and being (6.5o8e3-509bio). The demiurgic mind of the 
Timaeus is fundamentally good (29«) , and it is his necessarily benevolent will that 
results in his providence at 30CI. Whether Plutarch ever followed through the 
implications of this is doubtful, for there is no reason to suppose that Plutarch 
could not have placed the Good somehow within the figure of the demiurge, 
where pre-Plotinian Platonists sometimes placed the Platonic Ideas,41 though 
Middle Platonists often seemed equivocal on the Plotinian circle's vexed issue of 
whether Ideas are properly internal or external to the demiurgic mind. This may 
reflect a tendency of the era to see the Platonic demiurge as a complex figure, 
masking both the Idea of the Good and the power of creative intelligence.42 But 
41
 Most obviously in Seneca Epistle 65.7, and Alcinous 9.163.14—15. 
42
 So I think Numenius fr. 21, where Proclus (In Tim. 1.303.27) must if the evidence is to be consistent 
be speaking of the Platonic demiurge being a double persona for Numenius. embracing aspects of 
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the Proclan passage follows the idea through further. Pronoia becomes an activity 
of the Platonic demiurge prior and superior to the activities of intellect (415.23). 
Two activities on different metaphysical levels suggest separate entities, standing 
in the same relation as father and son. So in mythical terms the intelligent ruling 
god Zeus, whose name indicates the cause (Di-) and life-giver (Ze-) according 
to Plato's Cratylus (396a2—b3) as the passage observes, has as his father Kronos 
that which is prior to him, unsullied intellect (koros nous, Crat. 396b5~7). Thus 
Plato is thought to place a god with single transcendent activity, the Chaldaean 
'Once' , before a god of double transcendent activity, the Chaldaean 'Twice', 
who now gives his laws43 and now returns to remain in contemplation. 
Plutarch then is seen here leading into a discussion of two gods that are far 
more reminiscent of Numenius, but he himself is content like Atticus (e.g., fr. 
26) or Apuleius to speak of the demiurge of Plato's Timaeus as the supreme god, 
and many other Platonists would have agreed. However, even in Apuleius there 
seems to be a tendency towards the theoretical separation of two aspects of the 
demiurge, as Finamore's clever discussion of On Plato 193-4 shows.44 Here too 
we may have a modest step towards the kind of separation of two divine entities 
that we meet in Numenius and in chapters 10 and 28 of Alcinous. Finamore also 
seeks to relate this to Apuleius' description of the principal god and creator as 
'supra-mundane' at On Plato 204, but as caelestis at 193. Their Greek equivalents, 
one might have thought, could be applied to Alcinous' first god and heavenly 
intellect respectively. But that is if one takes caelestis as the adjective 'heavenly' 
as opposed to its common if poetic substantival sense of 'god'. Yet is it not 
strangely inept in the case of any transcendent god (supramundanus) to call it a 
caelestis even as a simple word for a god? Perhaps it is not, since even Plato's 
Phaedrus speaks of Zeus who is the great leader in the heavens, driving at the 
front in his winged chariot and arranging and caring for all things. 
his first and second gods. There is little evidence that any Platonist figure prior to Numenius ever 
felt the need to have an inert intellect god above the creator-god, and it is noticeable that Alcinous 
(of whom that might be claimed, though he is of unknown date) does not feel in sections directly 
dependent upon the Timaeus (excepting the digression on the interpretation of generation), the need 
to distinguish between his inert transcendent principle of goodness and his governing heavenly 
intellect as he does in the theological chapter io (164.17—27, 164.40—1Ó5.4) and again in the ethics 
(28.181.42-5). 
43
 One should note that Numenius' second god is called lawgiver in fr. 13. while his post-creational 
phase is seen in frs. 15 and 22 as retirement to his watchtower and as contemplation. 
44
 Finamore 2006: 35-7. especially 37: 'Apuleius refers separately to the first god and to his mind — 
not because they are separate in actuality (for they are not) but because they are separable in thought. 
G o d . . . is a mind but, in Apuleius' personal religious thought, he is the highest being in a truly 
personal re l igion. . . His nous is just one aspect of him, and a lower one than that.' One might seek 
to avoid Finamore's inclination here to link the lower aspect of this divinity with providence, not 
the higher. 
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The ambiguity of several Platonist theological positions from Plutarch on 
must be due in part to the variety of Platonic texts that the would-be follower 
of Plato had to take into account in a respectful manner. This could be seen 
in the way that Apuleius, dabbling in the new negative theology, has to over-
look one of the negative attributes implied by Parmenides 14233—6 at On Plato 
190. The text reads Quern quidem caelestem pronuntiat indicium, innominabilem, et 
ut ait ipse aoraton, adamaston. Reading adoxaston for this final term I translate 
'This celestial divinity he declares to be unable to be spoken of, unable to be 
named, and in Plato's own words "invisible" and "un-opinable".' This list of 
related privative adjectives is implied by two sentences at Parmenides 14233—6, 
including: 'So it has no name, no description, no knowledge, no perception,45 
no opinion', but it omits any term meaning 'unknowable', since that conflicts 
with the Timaeus' statement at 28C4 quoted by Apuleius immediately after-
wards: 'the creator and father of this universe is hard work to discover. Alcinous, 
who explicitly lists the via negativa among three ways of conceiving of god,4<s 
and employs several privative adjectives including (1) 'unspeakable' and (2) 'un-
needy' (164.31-32), (3) 'partless' (165.34), (4) 'motionless' (165.23/38), and 
(5) 'bodiless' (166.1), seems influenced directly or indirectly by the Parmenides, 
Whittaker's edition listing relevant parallels at I37d2—3, I38a6, 13864, I39a3, 
and I39b4—5.47 Again, however, the earlier Platonist shies away from drawing 
too many consequences for Plato's theology from the first hypothesis of the 
Parmenides, which Plotinus' school would embrace with relish. God may readily 
be called 'One',4"8 but he is not so content-less as the Parmenides might suggest, 
has positive attributes, and remains both god and intellect. 
Sometimes, however, there is a movement towards thinking in terms of 
metaphysical hypostases (mind, soul, etc.) rather than individual metaphysical 
entities. In Plutarch's essay On the Face of the Moon we read for intellect is better 
and diviner than soul to the same degree as soul compared with body' (943 a). 
The three are associated with Sun, Moon and Earth respectively, and, once 
souls have been purified of the body and risen to the lunar region, a 'second 
41
 One may claim that anaisthelon would have been more accurate but I suspect that Apuleius remem-
bers the Platonic discussion of things eternal and things transient at Phaedo 79a—b, which confines 
all sensation to the latter, but privileges sight and uses the adjective aoraton (bi2); just after this at 
84a8 the Phaedo speaks of what is 'true, divine, and un-opinable (adoxaston)'. I suggest that Apuleius. 
who has used this very passage at On Plato T93. has specifically remembered the use of these two 
adjectives there, prompting the ut ait ipse and the use of Greek. Plato does not use anônomaston, nor 
arrêton in a relevant sense and prominent context. 
46
 Didascalicus 10.165.16-34; the other ways are the via analogiae and the via eminentiae. 
47
 I42a3—6 might also have been mentioned, as it seems relevant to (1). 
48
 An example is Maximus Tyrius 29.7g. Aerius ι .7.31 O n the rather limited scope that the Pythago-
nzmg principles One and Dyad have in Plutarch see Opsomer 2007. 
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death' (9421) removes intellect from souls. More myth-like material in On the 
Sign of Socrates (591b) speaks of four principles (archat) of all life,49 of which 
the latter three are movement, generation and decay. Monad joins the first two 
in the invisible, Intellect the next two at the Sun, Nature the last two at the 
Moon. The triad Monad, Intellect and Nature may seem an obvious precursor 
of the Plotinian hypostases, but it is hardly performing a comparable function. 
Alcinous may confuse commentators on his theology when at 10.164.18—23 he 
writes as follows: 
Since than soul intellect is better, than intellect in potency the intellect that actively 
thinks all things together and for ever, and than this [intellect] its cause is fairer and 
whatever entity is established still higher than these, this would be the first god, which 
serves as cause of perpetual activity for the intellect of the entire heaven. 
However, while the language seems more abstract and hypostatic, it is clear to me 
that the intellect in perpetual activity is the heavenly intellect, that it is thinking 
all things intelligible, i.e., all the Platonic Ideas, and that the first god is conceived 
of as cause of this intellect's activity and as superior, qua supreme Good, to the 
remainder of the intelligible world: 'over and above intellect and being'.50 There 
is no suggestion that human beings can somehow ascend internally according 
to the same path by which their thoughts can grasp in succession each higher 
being at the universal level. The goal for us will be simply assimilation insofar 
as one can to the god within the heavens (28.181.42—5). Our intellectual goal 
can be reached by reason and instruction (182.5—8). No mystic union with the 
supreme principle seems possible in such a system. 
9 EPISTEMOLOGY FROM PLUTARCH TO ALCINOUS 
The first of Plutarch's Platonic Questions is devoted to explaining the Socratic 
midwifery of the Theaetetus, and especially the barrenness of Socrates in the 
role of intellectual midwife there (15OC7—8). The explanation (ioood—e) is that 
Socrates has no time for ordinary theories and doctrines, but only considered 
cognition of the divine and intelligible important. This knowledge cannot 
be discovered by resources of our own, nor implanted by teachers, but must 
be 'recollected'. By reducing young persons to perplexity before revealing 
the innate concepts that can, upon refinement and development, lead to the 
49
 The text is damaged; it may be that life is rather the first of principles. 
30
 For god as either intellect or over and above intellect see the language of Origen in dialogue with 
Celsus at Contra Celsum 7.38; the phrase is not used by Alcinous, but is clearly inspired by the Idea 
of the Good at Republic 6.509b9 where the phrase 'over and above being' is used; later Platonism 
introduces 'intellect' with some support from 5o8d—509a, for 5o8e3—4 makes it 'cause of knowledge 
and truth'. 
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desired recollection. With so radically different a notion of the knowledge that 
is aimed at, denying that the teacher qua teacher possesses it and affirming 
that the learner already has the seeds of it, it is unsurprising that Platonism 
works with an epistemology quite unlike that of rival philosophies. Plutarch 
himself, while entirely prepared to look at standard questions of physics or 
ethics in a more traditional and didactic manner, often prefers to teach through 
hints when dealing with the incorporeal entities that Platonism now makes its 
principal consideration. The epistemological necessity of recollection is claimed 
in the much-disputed fragments 15—17, which come from the Phaedo's exegetical 
tradition. Religious rites and myths are also seen as promoting enlightenment 
through recollection. 
This kind of epistemology, based on the idea of innate notions that are 
common, but not equally accessible, to all human beings, is also found in the 
papyrus Theaetetus commentator.51 Again this view sees midwifery as a kind of 
purificatory stage preparatory to progress in recollection by the pupil (46.43— 
48.11), for the midwife compels people to discuss and doubt their private notions 
(48.25—35). Latent common notions then need to be brought to the surface 
(47.19—24) and clarified (46.43—47.7) before one can give proper expression to 
them. The teacher is not obliged to be free of doctrine or to conceal it in 
all circumstances, but it must be avoided in this educative process (17.35—45, 
cf. 55.8—33). Since learning is identified with recollection, as in the Meno, and 
also with coming to know things, as at Theaetetus 145c—e (cf. 14.45—15.5), the 
end-point of recollection will be a kind of knowledge, the 'simple knowledge' 
that is prior to composite fields of knowledge (15.8—16). The author finds the 
definition of that simple knowledge at Meno 98a, thus confirming the Meno's, 
central place in this epistemology: simple knowledge is 'right opinion bound by 
cause of reasoning' according to the commentator's reading (3.2—3; 15.18—23). 
That this involves knowing-why as well as knowing-that may be inferred from 
3.3—7, but details are not tackled in what is extant. 
Meno 98a is important to a number of other relevant authors, including Albi-
nus (Prologue 6) and whichever Taurus composed a Commentary on the Republic 
where the part of column 15 that defines Platonic knowledge is duplicated (Tau-
rus 21 F). It is not, however, employed in the fourth chapter of Alcinous, where 
a different account of Platonic epistemology, privileging the Timaeus, Phaedrus, 
Philebus, Sophist and Theaetetus is given. Alcinous, seldom unduly influenced by 
dialogues regarded as 'Socratic' today, is keen throughout to make distinctions, 
51
 Text and commentary in Bastianini and Sedley 1995; its date in relation to Plutarch remains 
controversial, though most would agree on its similarities. The exegesis is mostly extant until about 
153c, with fragments at 157. 
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particularly between various cognitive faculties and their respective objects. 
The passage is notable for distinguishing between first and second intelligibles 
C155-39—42)> the former (— Ideas) being apprehended non-discursively by intel­
lection along with scientific reason, the latter (— immanent forms) by scientific 
reason along with intellection (156.5—8). He uses the concept of natural notions, 
regarding them as 'a kind of intellection stored up in the soul' mirroring true 
intellection that happens only in the discarnate state, and he claims that Plato 
refers to these notions as 'simple knowledge', 'plumage of the soul', and occa­
sionally 'memory', and they are the stuff of scientific reason (155.26—36). It 
may seem odd that the term 'recollection' is avoided here, though the theory is 
treated and explained in more than passing detail in relation to the arguments 
for the soul's immortality (25.177.45—178.12). The common notions of ethical 
qualities are also the basis for practical reasoning (156.19—23). The chapter has 
attracted quite a lot of attention, and contains insights into the ways in which 
second-century Platonism developed that cannot be paralleled in the fragments 
of others (partly because of the loss of any later commentaries on the Theaetetus). 
10 LOGIC IN ALCINOUS 
For logic we are again dependent primarily on Alcinous, though I have dealt ear­
lier with categories-theory in the context of the Platonist response to Aristotle. 
The content of most of those sections of the logic that were anticipated in 
the division of philosophy is relatively unsurprising, much of it Aristotelian 
with a Platonic veneer, and I shall concentrate on sections that I believe more 
original. The analytics has a distinctly non-Aristotelian appearance, for Alci­
nous highlights several high-profile ascent-passages from central dialogues: the 
ascent to the beautiful from Symposium 210a—e (157.16—21), leaving the physical 
for the intelligible; the methods οι Republic 6.510b—d and Phaedrus 245c—246a 
(157.21—36) leading from demonstrated to undemonstrated intuitions; and the 
hypothetical method οι Phaedo i o i d (with another nod to Republic 510b), lead­
ing from hypothesis to non-hypothetical principle. The author's enthusiasm for 
specifically Platonic content leads him to offer a miniature interpretation of the 
Euthydemus as a Platonic handbook of eristics (159.38—42), corresponding to 
Aristotle's De sophisticis elenchis as the Parmenides foreshadows the ten categories 
of Categories (159.43—44). And it leads to a still lengthier interpretation of the 
Cratylus (160.3—41), which makes names conventional, but the name-giver only 
names correctly if the name reflects the nature of the thing to which it refers. 
Alcinous' interest in the so-called 'logical' dialogues of Plato is underscored by 
the way in which he contrives to conclude the political section with material 
based on the Statesman as Whittaker's apparatus shows (189.5-11), after which he 
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appends his discussion of the sophist, offering a miniature interpretation of the 
Sophist (189.12—27). The chapter balances the opening discussion of philosophy 
and the philosopher, but Alcinous appears to be adding his own material of 
an interpretative nature, which again presupposes a certain familiarity with the 
corpus on the part of the reader, to what had been originally designed more as 
a handbook of doctrines. 
11 BASICS OF PHYSICS 
The Timaeus has always dominated any picture of Platonic physics. It is the 
basis of chapters 12 to 23 in Alcinous, which include some material that might 
be called 'theological' in 12—15, including discussion of the paradigms and of 
daimones, while 23 shifts to psychology, still maintaining a Timaeus-b&sed focus 
because it deals with the way the soul is combined with the human body. In 
contrast to the anti-Aristotelian Atticus (fr. 5) he seems to accept that aether 
is a fifth element in chapter 15, but there is no elaboration. Apuleius tends 
rather to regard it as a pure kind of fire in On the God of Socrates 138, but 
allows it to remain a separate element at On the World 291. An imaginative 
discussion of the five regular solids (Timaeus 53C-55C) and their relationship to 
the elements, based on the theory of Theodorus of Soli, appears in Plutarch's 
On the Obsolescence of Oracles (427'a-42.8a), but Ammonius seems sceptical of 
the five-element theory. Except perhaps for Atticus, these are not hard-fought 
issues, and Galen, at the beginning of his commentary on the dialogue's medical 
significance, bears witness to the tendency of commentators on the Timaeus to 
stop before they get to physics proper. 
Much more interesting is the issue of fate, which was a challenge to Platonists, 
since unlike the Stoics they wanted for the sake of their ethics to preserve some 
genuine autonomy for human beings, and yet Plato had made the creator show 
the newly created souls the fated laws' of the world at Timaeus 41e. Plutarch 
shows at Moralia 740c—d how fate, chance and individual autonomy are all 
allowed for in the Myth of Er at the conclusion of the Republic. The same passage 
is employed by Alcinous, whose fundamental position in chapter 26 is that all 
things are within fate's domain, but not all things are actually fated. Further, 
while our choice of lives and of actions is a free choice, the consequences of this 
choice 'will be brought to completion in accordance with fate' (179.12—13). 
Fate is thus a little like a law of cause and effect. An unusual treatise On Fate is 
included among Plutarch's works, though it is agreed to be by another author. 
It is notable for its doctrine of three stages of providence (572f~574d), detected 
in the creator himself, in the heavenly powers and in the daimones who watch 
over us on earth. They are all detected in the Timaeus, particularly at 41e—42e, 
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and whereas fate is subject to the primary providence, the second providence is 
somehow implicated with fate, while the third is posterior to fate and subject 
to it. 
12 PSYCHOLOGY 
Middle Platonist psychology employs, as expected, the tripartition of soul famil­
iar from Plato's Republic, but not to the exclusion of the bipartite division asso­
ciated rather with Aristotle. O n the boundaries of Platonism, Galen's defence 
of the tripartition against Chrysippus in On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato 
is particularly well known. Alcinous in Didascalicus chapter 23 uses the three 
physical locations of the human soul from Timaeus 69c—72c, which he admits 
might have been employed in the preceding physical section (176.7), to lead into 
a dedicated discussion of psychology. This begins with a section demonstrating 
that the tripartition extends to the powers of the soul (1) because different phys­
ical locations are allotted to them, (2) because the powers are sometimes found 
to be in conflict, and (3) because the emotions and reasoning require a different 
education, teaching and habituation respectively. This is only represented as an 
argument for bipartition, and it followed another sign that the division between 
reason and emotion is what really matters (176.42). 
Equally essential to the revived Platonism is the immortality of soul. Alci­
nous collects arguments from the Phaedo, Republic 10 and Phaedrus in chapter 25, 
where he also discusses the vexed question of the scope of this doctrine. We know 
that at some time this became a standard topos in the commentary tradition, 
and Harpocration, who was late enough to have been influenced by Numenius 
in many respects, is cited by Hermeias (15 τ) as a proponent of the view that 
even souls of ants and flies are immortal, since the Phaedrus (245C5) declares 
the immortality of all soul, and that human souls, as Numenius too maintained 
(fr. 49), could therefore transmigrate into the meanest of creatures (18—19 τ). 
Alcinous (178.26—32) offers arguments against the immortality of utterly irra­
tional souls, and Timaeus 69C7—8, to which people like Albinus (test. 16 G) and 
Atticus (fr. 15) made appeal, supports them by referring to the extra form of 
soul added on by the younger gods as 'mortal'. Yet, also in conformity with 
the Timaeus (90e—92c), he adopts the belief that human souls can migrate into 
animals (178.36). And he also finds the equivalent of the appetitive and spirited 
faculties of humans in the souls of the gods (their hormëtikon and oikeiôtikon, 
178.39—46), so that tripartition does not in itself entail our possession of mortal 
parts of the soul. O n the equally vexed contemporary question of why the soul 
descends into a body,52 Alcinous is content to give some alternatives (178.36—8), 
52
 This issue becomes more complex after Cronius. Numenius (fr. 48), and Harpocration (16—17 T) 
come to regard all entry into bodies as an evil for the soul. 
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including innocuous reasons like conformity with an arithmetic cycle or with 
divine will, and more sinister ones like the soul's own unbridled or body-loving 
nature. 
13 ETHICS, GOAL AND VIRTUES 
The ethics of the Middle Platonists can be spoken of as an area of greater 
agreement, though there were generally dissenters on any given issue. As in 
logic there was a tendency to appropriate for Plato what was perceived as 
useful in Aristotle, and certainly the Aristotelian doctrine that the moral virtues 
were both in one sense an extreme and in another a mean between two vices 
was employed by authors such as Plutarch (in On Moral Virtue), Apuleius (De 
Platone 228) and Alcinous (30.184.14-36). The appropriation is partiallyjustified 
by such passages as Statesman 283c—285c and Philebus 23c—30e. There will be 
subtractions from and additions to the Aristotelian virtues, but one may say that 
orthodox early imperial Platonism inclines towards Aristotle on this issue. 
A significant issue in the ethics of the day are the passions or affections 
(pathë), which some Stoic theory would have desired to eradicate completely. 
The passions for the Stoics were pleasure, pain, desire and fear, all so defined as to 
have them involve irrationally excessive responses to what one was experiencing. 
Plato sometimes seemed to turn desire and fear into expectations or anticipations 
of pleasure and pain respectively (e.g., Protagoras 356d, Philebus 34c—36b), so that 
the Platonist would naturally give precedence in the discussion to pleasure and 
pain. But Plato's principal discussion of pleasure in the Philebus did not encourage 
one to forsake pleasure altogether, merely to choose what was appropriate -
indeed it left the life completely isolated from pleasure to the gods (33b), 
demanding something more complex to humans. The complex psychology 
demanded by the Platonists, with parts of the soul required to look after the 
interests of the body, made the eradication of pleasures and pains as usually defined 
impossible. Equally the affections were something usually opposed to reason, 
and one could not afford to have them grow stronger than reason. Therefore 
such authors as Plutarch, Taurus (17 τ) and Alcinous (32.186.14—29) favoured 
metriopatheia or the moderation of the passions, at least in the case of those 
passions that allowed moderation. 
Problems with interpreting Plato's various discussions of virtue lead to the 
postulation of different levels of virtues or quasi-virtues, as also in Plotinus 
Ennead 2.2. I have treated this topic more fully in Tarrant (2007b), and argue 
that both Alcinous and Apuleius actually envisage three levels: a first at the natural 
level involving natural good qualities, a second at the level of habituation and 
involving effort to make progress, and a third involving learning and reasoning. 
These are all ways of coming close to the moral goal according to Alcinous 
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(28.182.3-6), and after a largely unsurprising discussion of Platonic virtue he 
goes on to affirm at the beginning of chapter 30 that there are virtues in other 
senses too, named after the complete virtues. He employs for them the terms for 
natural endowments (euphuiaî) and advancements (prokopaì). It is natural to take 
these separately as the former strive to build upon whatever nature has given 
one. A particular feature of non-perfect virtues is that one may possess some 
without others, unlike the perfect virtues (29.183.15—16). It may also be implied 
that they admit of greater and lesser degrees of intensity, something denied of 
perfect virtue. Apuleius discusses these matters in On Plato 2.228, though here 
again there is usually some ambiguity about whether we are dealing with two 
types of virtues or three. However, one thing this text does is to make explicit 
the need for nature, exercise and teaching all to be contributing if virtue is to 
be perfected. In the anonymous Theaetetus commentator too (11.13—12.8) we 
also seem to have three sets of desirable qualities: natural endowments, the same 
under further development, and virtue proper. I argue that Aristotelian texts 
like Politics 7.13.1332338—40 postulating the desirability of all three, as well as 
Protagoras' great speech in Plato's Protagoras, have been influential in refining 
the later Platonic account of the various kinds of virtues. 
Finally we must mention the moral goal or telos. Platonists during this period 
seem to be in general agreement that Plato's moral goal has been best expressed 
in the phrase 'assimilation to god insofar as is possible' (Theaetetus 176b etc.). 
Relevant texts include Plutarch On Divine Vengeance 55od—e, anon. Commentary 
on the Theaetetus 7, Albinus Prologue 5, Alcinous chapter 28, and Apuleius On 
Plato 2.252—3. Since most philosophies tended to align their concepts of what a 
god is with what a human ought to be, it was probably not their most controversial 
doctrine. However, this ought to warn us that the idea of assimilation to god 
might change as one's concept of god changes. It is in this context that we 
should view the clarification of Alcinous at 181.44: 'obviously the heavenly 
god, not in Zeus' name the god above the heavens'. Alcinous' first god owes 
much to Aristotle's unmoved mover (10.164.23—31) as well as to Plato's Idea of 
the Good. The first known figure to interpret Plato as postulating an unmoved 
god of this type and distinguishing it from any power active within the cosmos 
was Numenius in the middle of the second century. We have seen also in 
relation to the psychology that Alcinous seems to be aware of developments in 
the time of Numenius and Harpocration, so it seems logical to see Alcinous as 
already responding to some of Numenius' ideas. Timaeus 90a—d had clearly been 
advocating that we assimilate our souls to the perfectly rational soul moving and 
governing in the heavens, giving a reasonable idea of what kind of god Plato 
thought one should assimilate oneself to. Assimilation to anything akin to an 
Aristotelian unmoved mover sounds a ridiculous goal for human beings. 
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I think that we have confirmation here of my reading of Alcinous' text as an 
updated handbook, building on some traditional basics, but responding also to 
issues and ideas that were part of the intellectual world of his own time. 
CONCLUSION 
Early imperial Platonism may easily seem unexciting if one expects to find here 
ideas akin to those found in Plotinus or in Proclus. This is a period when Platonic 
interpretation was finding its feet, and what it meant to be a Platonist was still 
far from clear. There were significant differences of opinion in some areas, while 
other areas of philosophy were not so contentious. Anything involving theology, 
religion and our understanding of what we are doing in this world was perhaps 
most likely to receive serious attention, become controversial, and lead forward 
to the solutions offered by the school of Plotinus. 
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